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ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE INFILTRATION OF
LEGITIMATE BUSINESS: CIVIL REMEDIES FOR
"CRIMINAL ACTIVITY"
I. INTRODUCTION
Members of organized crime operations1 often rationalize
their conduct with claims that theirs is just another business and
they are ordinary businessmen. 2 In 1970, Congress may have
used such claims as a basis for developing new methods of con-
trolling organized crime activities. The result was Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA-70),3 designed,
through the use of civil remedies of the type traditionally used
against antitrust 4  violators, to prevent the infiltration of
legitimate 5 business enterprises by organized crime.6
I The secretive and hostile nature of criminal activity has made it impossible to
determine the precise structure of "organized crime." But there is sufficient available
information to support the conclusion that there are one or more such organizations in
existence. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S Comi'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 33 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPORT].
2 See, e.g., Eskenazi, 'We're Just Businessmen,' Bookie Insists, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1975,
at 36, col. 5.
3 Title IX, § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970). Title IX was originally introduced
by Senators McClellan and Hruska as a separate bill, [S. 1861, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1969)].
4 Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). One commentator, who was critical of the
entire OCCA-70, called Title IX the worst provision of the Act. He described it as a
"melange which appears to have come from someone's notion that concepts borrowed
from the antitrust field might be applied to get at successful racketeers who have used
their ill-gotten gains to expand into legitimate enterprises." King, Wild Shots in the War on
Crime, 20 J. PUB. L. 85, 108 (1971) (footnote omitted).
For the significance and propriety of the term "legitimate" see text accompanying
notes 36-76 infra.
6 Actually none of the provisions of OCCA-70 are limited to only the activities of
"organized crime." United States v. Campanale, Nos. 73-2643, 73-2833, 73-2747, 73-2865
(9th Cir., June 4, 1975):
There is no doubt that Congress was concerned with organized crime in
passing this amendment to the Hobbs Act. The official short title of the statute
evidences this concern. But quite obviously Congress focused on some of the
kinds of activities by which individuals and associations engaged in organized
crime maintained their income or influence. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962,
makes unlawful such activities no matter who engages therein.
Id. at 16. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAM E LAW. 55, 61, 62 (1970); Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime:
Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal Law, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41, 48
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Evidence of such incursion is well documented. 7 In a report
on the forerunners of Tide IX the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association, relying primarily on the Task Force
Report for its evidence, said:
Organized crime.., is a major threat to the proper
functioning of the American economic system, which is
grounded in freedom of decision. When organized
crime moves into a business, it customarily brings all the
techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in
its illegal businesses. The effect of competitive or
monopoly power attained this way is even more un-
wholesome than other monopolies because its position
does not rest in economic superiority.
8
Section 1962") defines the "prohibited activities" to which
Tide IX is directed. Section 1962(a)'0 prohibits the use of pro-
ceeds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire an interest in an enter-
(1970): "Therefore although it is entitled 'The Organized Crime Control Act of [1970]',
the term, 'organized crime' indicates primarily the occasion and motivation for its enact-
ment and only in varying degrees the target for its impact."
7
See SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 151-62 (1951); TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5; D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION 99-108 (1969). See
also Kefauver, Crime in America, in ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 282-94 (G. Tyler ed.
1962); Porter, On Wall Street, in id. 298-302.
8 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF ANTITRUST SECTION ON S. 2048 AND S.
2049, in Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 556-57 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
The Antitrust Section Report also contains a brief history of the use of antitrust laws
in combatting organized crime infiltration of legitimate business. The Section found the
antitrust laws insufficient and endorsed Title IX.
9a 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
,o 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within
the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enter-
prise which is engaged in or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of invest-
ment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of
the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of
his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or [sic] rack-
eteering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not
amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one
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prise engaging in or affecting interstate commerce. Section
1962(b) 1' proscribes the acquisition of an interest in such an
enterprise by means of a pattern of racketeering or loanshark-
ing. Section 1962(c) 12 focuses on the method of operating the
enterprise once it is acquired and prohibits the use of racketeer-
ing or loansharking in the conduct of the business.
13
The key phrase, "racketeering activity," is given a broad
scope in section 1961(1),14 where it is defined to include a mul-
class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more
directors of the issuer.
For a critical analysis of § 1962(a), see Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974).
11 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
" See generally text accompanying note 53 infra.
14 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1970) provides:
"[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnap-
ing, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of
the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to
bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473
(relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate ship-
ment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to
extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of
gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relat-
ing to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction ofjustice), section 1510
(relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interfer-
ence with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to rackateer-
ing), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering parapher-
nalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955
(relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and
2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 242 1-24
(relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29,
United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans
to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union
funds), or (D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States.
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titude of crimes. Section 1961(5)15 sets two as the minimum
number of racketeering acts necessary to create a "pattern." Sec-
tion 1963,16 entitled "Criminal Penalties," includes a maximum
prison sentence of twenty years, a maximum fine of $25,000,
and the forfeiture of any business interest acquired or held in
violation of the Act. Section 196417 permits civil actions against
violators of section 1962. Subsection (a) gives United States dis-
trict courts jurisdiction to "prevent and restrain violations of sec-
tion 1962," through orders requiring divestiture, restrictions on
future activities and investments, dissolution or reorganization of
the enterprise, or other orders at the court's discretion.18 Subsec-
tion (b) gives the Attorney General authority to institute these
civil actions; subsection (c) permits private individuals to bring
treble damage suits; and subsection (d) provides for collateral
estoppel in any civil action as to issues decided in a previous
criminal prosecution.
The remaining sections of Title IX govern venue and ser-
vice of process,"'I expedition of cases,20 public access to the
proceedings,21 and the use of the "civil investigative demand. '22
Title IX, in its entirety, is an attempt to meet, in part, the
criticism that the criminal law has been oriented toward the indi-
vidual too much to be of much use as a weapon against or-
15 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1970).
I 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1970) provides:
The district courts of the United States have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, includ-
ing, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the
future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to,
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the
enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign com-
merce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons.
19 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1970).
20 18 U.S.C. § 1966 (1970).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1967 (1970).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1970). Section 1968 was modeled after the provision for use of
the civil investigative demand in antitrust investigations. SENATE COMIM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
Under the civil investigative demand, the Attorney General can compel presentation
of documentary material he believes relevant to a civil racketeering investigation. It is the
civil counterpart to the grand jury as an information seeking device. 15 U.S.C. §§
1311-14 (1970).
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ganized crime. Professor of Sociology Donald Cressey has aptly
expressed that failing:
[T]here is a proclivity in our society_.., to view
criminality as an individual matter rather than as an
organizational matter. . . . [T]he criminal's behavior is
usually viewed, both popularly and scientifically, as a
problem of individual maladjustment, not as a conse-
quence of his participation in social systems. Consis-
tently, the law enforcement process has been, by and
large, designed for the control of individuals, not for
the control of organizations.
23
Title IX's criminal forfeiture provision and its civil remedies
-especially divestiture and dissolution-are directed towards re-
ducing the power of those people in organized crime through
restraint of their economic activity. The new civil remedies, how-
ever, are not the only advantages prosecutors derive from sec-
tion 1964. The section also eliminates troublesome problems in
prosecuting organized crime: the existence of strict constitu-
tional protections for criminal defendants and the difficulty of
accumulating evidence.2 4 Senator McClellan, a co-sponsor of the
bill that was incorporated into OCCA-70 as Title IX, explained
the importance of Title IX in hearings before a House Judiciary
Subcommittee:
[T]he criminal process has suffered from two major
limitations as a means of protecting our economic in-
stitutions from . . . infiltration [by organized crime].
The first... is procedural .... [O]ur law quite properly
has burdened the government in a criminal case with
strict procedural handicaps .... 25
He noted that civil proceedings would provide the government
advantages unavailable in a criminal case, such as a lower stan-
dard of proof, the right to amend pleadings, the right to appeal
an adverse verdict, and the opportunity to use discovery
procedures. 26 The second major limitation of the criminal pro-
23 D. CRESSEY, supra note 7, at 67. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 78-79;
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 114-15.
24 See Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A
Preliminary Analysis, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
25 Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Relating to the Control of Organized Crime
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 106 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
2 6 1d. 106, 107.
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cess in combatting organized crime's penetration of legitimate
business, according to Senator McClellan, is "the limited scope of
criminal remedies. 27 All of these advantages of a civil action
were certainly major considerations in Congress' desire to deal
with organized crime without being bothered by the niceties of
criminal procedure. 8
These new Title IX methods of attempting to contain or-
ganized crime through civil remedies present troublesome ques-
tions. This Comment will first examine the question whether
section 1964, through the prohibitions of section 1962, reaches
the operation of wholly illegitimate enterprises as well as the
infiltration of legitimate businesses. For instance, may the gov-
ernment bring a Title IX action against the operators of an
illegal gambling or narcotics business which has no connection
with any legitimate business?
The Comment will next examine constitutional problems in
connection with section 1964 actions. First, the question will be
explored whether the use of civil actions by the United States
Government as a means of combatting selected "criminal" activ-
ity deprives defendants in such actions of constitutionally
guaranteed protections. The assurance of assistance of counsel,29
the right to refuse to be a witness against oneself,30 and the
government's burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable
doubt 31 are absent from civil proceedings. But the importance of
these safeguards to a criminal defendant, confronted with the
power of the state, is enormous. It has long been established that
the government may not deprive citizens of these constitutionally
27Id. 107.
2' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 80, 81; House Hearings, supra note 25, at 106,
107; letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to Senator McClellan,
Aug. 11, 1969, in Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 404, 408:
[The civil remedies] . . . should enable the Government to intervene in
many situations which are not susceptible to proof of a criminal violation....
[T]he civil procedure under which section 1964 actions are governed, with its
lesser standard of proof, non-jury adjudication proceedings, amendment of
pleadings, etc. will provide a valuable new method of attacking the evil aimed at
in this bill.
See also PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMI'N, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 93 (1970). This
report includes a comment on Pennsylvania's reasons for enacting a racketeering statute
copied almost verbatim from section 1964 (PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 911(b), (d) (1973)): "One
feature of the legislation is that by treating violations as civil questions, it lessens the
burdens of proof, simplifies legal procedures, and affords the government broader rights
of pre-trial discovery."
29 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
"U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
"See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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protected rights merely by attaching the "civil" label to a judicial
proceeding.32 On the other hand, the power of the government
to employ civil actions pursuant to its regulatory powers in the
control and promotion of commerce ig also well settled. 33 This
Comment will attempt to place the section 1964 action some-
where along the continuum stretching from the clearly criminal
case (for example, a murder prosecution) to the clearly regula-
tory action (for example, a suit to enjoin a merger).3 4 Second,
the Comment will examine the constitutional problems of assur-
ing compliance with orders issued under section 1964 by a
further court order requiring guilty defendants to provide the
government with sworn reports of their current addresses,
sources of income, and other business records, to demonstrate
compliance with the injunction.
The Comment will conclude, first, that Title IX is meant to
reach only cases in which members of organized crime acquire
or influence businesses that are otherwise legitimate; and sec-
ond, that the statute, whether or not so limited, is a constitu-
tional exercise of the federal government's power to regulate
commerce 35 even though certain remedial orders may be con-
stitutionally prohibited.
II. THE SCOPE OF TITLE IX: ARE ILLEGAL
ENTERPRISES INCLUDED?
A. The Effect of a Broad Interpretation of "Enterprise"
The Senate Judiciary Committee summed up the purpose of
Title IX as follows: "It has as its purpose the elimination of the
infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce. '36 Section 1961,
however, which provides definitions for the operative terms used
in Title IX, makes no reference to "legitimate organizations" in
defining "enterprise." The definition is extremely broad, en-
compassing "any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity. '37
11 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
'3 See, e.g., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-31 (1970) (antitrust); 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-34 (1970) (food and drug).
34 See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
3' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (commerce clause).
36 SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 76 (emphasis supplied).
37 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970).
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If the literal, expansive reading of the statute prevails over
the limited congressional purpose expressed above, the utility of
Title IX will be substantially enlarged. It will be a weapon capa-
ble of use against conventional criminal operations such as
gambling, counterfeiting, or any of the other criminal acts de-
scribed as "racketeering activity," regardless of the perpetrators'
involvement in any legitimate business. Since criminal penalties
already exist in the statutes defining the racketeering acts
specified in Title IX,3 8 to say that racketeering alone subjects one
to Title IX's criminal penalties is not particularly significant. The
principal importance of the expansion lies in Title IX's civil
remedies, because none of the basic criminal statutes provide for
civil remedies as authorized in section 1964.
Section 1964 authorizes district courts "to prevent and re-
strain violations of section 1962" through orders requiring inter
alia divestiture of the "enterprise" or restrictions on engaging in
similar "enterprises." If section 1962 is read as requiring infiltra-
tion into legitimate enterprises, the district courts' orders might
be limited to the removal of the corruptive influence from the
legitimate enterprise rather than prohibition of the underlying
racketeering activity.
The expansive reading of "enterprise" to include totally il-
licit operations would make the civil remedies applicable to a
greater number of potential defendants. Despite the substantial
evidence of criminal infiltration of legitimate business 39 there is
no indication that all or even most organizations that engage in
racketeering activity also have legitimate interests. Criminal or-
ganizations whose activity is limited to illicit operations would be
immune from a section 1964 civil action if Title IX is limited to
infiltration of legitimate business.
Moreover, the use of the government's new remedies
against organized crime activities would be facilitated by the
elimination of a major evidentiary obstacle. Instead of having to
show, first, that the defendants have engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity, and second, that the racketeering activity is
the basis for acquisition or operation of a legitimate business, the
government would have to show only the commission of acts
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) (gambling); 18 U.S.C. §§ 471-73 (1970) (counter-
feiting). There would, however, be some additional benefit to prosecutors in being able
to use § 1963's criminal penalties because these penalties are generally much more severe
than the penalties provided in the primary criminal statutes.
39 See sources cited note 7 supra.
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constituting racketeering activity. Thus, even if the government
decided to bring a section 1964 action against a narcotics dis-
tributor, for example, who used some of his profits to purchase a
trucking business, the government would have a much easier
case for the use of its new civil remedies if it could treat the
narcotics operation as the "enterprise" and not have to show the
connection with the trucking business.
40
In United States v. Cappetto,41 the only reported decision in-
volving section 1964, the government alleged violation of sec-
tions 1962(b), (c), and (d). Defendants were charged with operat-
ing an illegal gambling operation on the premises in which one
defendant maintained an otherwise legitimate billiards parlor.
The government could have sustained a section 1964 action
under the narrow reading of "enterprise" by showing that the
pool hall was operated through a pattern of racketeering
activity.4 2 Because the courts must be careful, in implementing
regulatory policies, to impose only the least burdensome remedy
consistent with the purpose of the statute,43 the proper remedy
under such a proceeding would have been mere divestiture of
the pool hall or an order requiring separate operation of the two
activities. If Title IX's scope is limited to preservation of the
integrity of legitimate enterprise there would have been no jus-
tification for the application of civil remedies against the illicit
activity.
44
40 For an argument that proof of the second requirement would be extremely dif-
ficult, see the dissenting views of Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan in HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, H. REP.
No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 185-86 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
Their statements, written with a Title IX criminal prosecution in mind, speak accord-
ingly of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even under a reduced civil burden of proof,
having to prove the connection between the illicit and licit operations would be a substan-
tial burden. The example described in the text envisions a case based on § 1962(a) but
similar problems of proof would exist under subsections (b) & (c).
This difficulty may have been the reason for Title IX's dormancy throughout its first
three years, and its infrequent use thus far. Tt~e United States Attorney's office for the
Northern District of Illinois, the principal user of Title IX, has only brought three cases,
two civil and one criminal. See letter from Peter F. Vairo, Attorney in Charge, Chicago
Strike Force, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Jan. 23, 1975, on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
41 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Feb. 11, 1975).
For a report on the controversy generated by the Cappetto decision see Wall St. J., Oct. 31,
1975, at 18, col. 4.
42 The most difficult hurdle under this approach would have been establishing that
the pool hall was an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.
41 See note 129 infra and accompanying text.
41 Courts have wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies for antitrust violations
200
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In Cappetto, however, the government was not content with a
remedy that would permit the gambling operation to continue.
The major thrust of its prayer for relief was a request for an
order enjoining the defendants from participating in any gam-
bling businesses regardless of its effect on legitimate business.
45
The government apparently realized that such relief could not
be justified unless a gambling operation was an "enterprise" over
which the district court had jurisdiction under Title IX. Only
then could the mere conduct of such an operation be treated as a
continuing violation of the statute. Both the district court 46 and
the court of appeals 47 approved of the expansive reading of the
term "enterprise," paving the way for an injunction prohibiting
the defendants from future participation in any gambling "en-
terprises."
B. The Proper Scope of "Enterprise"
The Seventh Circuit, in Cappetto, claimed support for their
broad interpretation of "enterprise" in the statutory language
and the legislative history.48 While conceding that one of Con-
gress' concerns was the corruption of legitimate businesses, the
court found this concern to be expressed in subsection (a)
49 of
section 1962. Subsections (b)50 and (c), 51 the court reasoned, are
addressed to any racketeering activity affecting commerce,
whether or not a legitimate business is involved.
Violation of any of the three subsections, however, depends
on the existence of an "enterprise." The court's strained distinc-
tion in Cappetto between subsection (a) and subsections (b) and (c)
is not warranted. The attempt to distinguish between "enter-
prise" as used in subsection (a) and its use in subsections (b) and
(c) conflicts with the clear statutory purpose expressed in section
1961(4) that there be a uniform definition of the term through-
and have been permitted to prohibit actions which are not per se illegal, see, e.g., United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724 (1944). Such a rationale might
permit a court to prohibit illegal racketeering activity, but only if the court were con-
vinced that such an order created less of a burden than divestiture of the business.
45 Complaint for Injunction,filed Feb. 22, 1974, in Appendix to Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 44.
46 Decision of the District Court Rendered Orally, Apr. 22, 1974, in Appendix to
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 25.
47 502 F.2d at 1358.
4 8
Id.
49 Note 10 supra.
50 Note 11 supra.
51 Note 12 supra.
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out Title IX. 52 The difference in the subsections is explained by
the different ways in which legitimate enterprises can be cor-
rupted. The true significance of dividing section 1962 into three
subsections is clearly expressed in the House Report on
OCCA-70: "Section 1962 establishes a threefold prohibition
aimed at stopping the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate
organizations.
53
Professor Donald Cressey's analysis provides a logical basis
for having three subsections each of which is protective of
legitimate business. "Some businesses are legitimately purchased
with the fruits of crime and operated legitimately. Others are
legitimately purchased with the fruits of crime and operated
illegitimately. A third possibility involves illegitimate acquisition
and legitimate operation, while the fourth alternative is to ac-
quire a business illegitimately and then operate it illegiti-
mately. ' 54 Section 1962 is designed to cover all these permuta-
tions. The first possibility is prohibited by subsection (a); the
second by (a) and (c); the third by (b); and the fourth by (b) and
(c).
In attempting to find support in the legislative history for its
position, the Cappetto court quoted a statement from the Senate
Report on OCCA-70 which concluded that the federal govern-
ment must be given power "to prohibit directly substantial busi-
ness enterprises of gambling. '55 The quoted material is not part
of the report on Title IX, however; it was offered in support of
Title VIII, Part C of OCCA-70, which was codified as section
1955 of title 18 of the United States Code. Prior to passage of
section 1955, direct federal control over gambling offenses could
be exercised only when there was interstate transmission of wa-
gering information,56 interstate travel in aid of racketeering,5 7 or
interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia. 58 Based on
a congressional finding that gambling operations above a certain
52 Since Cappetto did not involve section 1962(a), the court's comments about the
differing purpose of subsection (a) were dictum. The language is important, however,
because it indicates that the court recognized that Title IX is not simply another way of
defining acts already made illegal in other parts of title 18 of the United States Code.
53 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 40, at 39.
54 D. CRESSEY, supra note 8, at 100.
55 502 F.2d at 1358, quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 73.
56 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970).
57 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
58 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1970).
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size affect interstate commerce,5 9 section 1955 was designed to
permit federal criminal prosecution of gambling without having
to show specific interstate travel or transportation.
6 0
It is significant that section 1955, which is designed to deal
specifically with gambling per se, provides only for criminal
penalties with no mention of civil remedies. Yet the Cappetto
court was able to find justification for the extension of the civil
remedies of section 1964 to gambling operations in a statement
made in support of section 1955.
The inappropriateness of the court's reasoning is demon-
strated further by its failure to perceive that gambling is but one
of more than a dozen types of racketeering activity defined in
section 1961(1). The court's language does not suggest that it
would limit Title IX's coverage of illicit enterprises to gambling
operations; and, indeed, nothing in the statute's language or
legislative history indicates that an illegal gambling business is to
be singled out from other illegal businesses. The reason for
enacting section 1955 was to equate gambling offenses with the
other forms of racketeering by providing for a federal criminal
prohibition. If the defendants in Cappetto had been operating an
illegal counterfeiting or narcotics business, the court presumably
would have realized the irrelevance of using the statement on
the need for federal criminal prosecution directed against
gambling in construing the scope of Title IX.
Although Cappetto is the only appellate decision in a Title IX
civil case and the only decision on the inclusion of illicit busi-
nesses, the court found support in United States v. Parness, 6 a
Title IX criminal prosecution in the Second Circuit, for the
proposition that "enterprise" was intended to have a broad
meaning. The government charged the defendants in Parness
with interstate transportation of stolen property6 2 and with ac-
quisition of an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity consisting of the transportation of the stolen
property.6 3 The enterprise in question was a hotel, unquestiona-
bly within the scope of Title IX. The defendants argued, how-
-9 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 73.
60 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) has been held constitutional, United States v. Sacco, 491
F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974).
61 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 775 (1975).
62 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970).
63 The definition of racketeering in section 1961 includes violations of 18 U.S.C. §
2314 (1970), see note 14 supra.
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ever, that because the hotel was located in a foreign country, 64 it
was not an "enterprise" within the meaning of the Act. The
court rejected this rather frivolous argument, citing the refer-
ence to "interstate or foreign commerce" in section 1962 and
therefore defining "enterprise" broadly enough to include both
domestic and foreign corporations:
"Enterprise" is defined in § 1961(4) to include "any...
corporation." On its face the proscription is all inclusive.
It permits no inference that the Act was intended to
have a parochial application. The legislative history,
moreover, strongly indicates the intent of Congress that
this provision be broadly construed.
6 5
The court, however, used this broad language 66 and supporting
legislative history only to buttress its narrow holding that the
Title IX prohibitions include foreign as well as domestic enter-
prises, and did not address the question whether "enterprise"
encompasses illegal as well as legal businesses.
Furthermore, even a casual examination of the legislative
history reveals that although Congress certainly was concerned
with the effect of totally illicit operations on the economy, it
chose to limit Title IX to a more direct assault on our economic
system-the infiltration of legitimate business. It is impossible to
point to any specific congressional refutation of the idea that
Title IX applies to illicit businesses. This absence appears to be
explained not by congressional uncertainty but by the apparent
unanimity of belief that the Act would apply only to infiltration
of legitimate business. The Senate Report, 67 the House Report,
68
the Justice Department's recommendation, 69 the concurring view
of Senator Scott,7 0 the views of the House dissenters,7 ' and dis-
64 The court pointed out that the hotel had been owned by an American citizen,
financed with American funds, had numerous American creditors, and primarily served
American tourists. 503 F.2d at 439 n. 11.
65 503 F.2d at 439.
66 The Parness court can perhaps be excused for its excessive prose because it was
justifiably concerned with the patently frivolous attempt to limit the definition of "enter-
prise" to domestic operations. Prior to Cappetto there was never any suggestion that Title
IX would cover illicit enterprises.
67 SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 76-83, 159.
68 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 40, at 56-57.
69 Letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to Senator McClellan,
Aug. 11, 1969, in Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 405.
70 SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 211, 214.
71 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 40, at 4081.
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cussions on the floor of the Senate72 and House of Repre-
sentatives 73 before passage of OCCA-70, clearly express an in-
tent limited to attacking organized crime's incursions into legal
enterprises.
74
72 116 CONG. REC. 591, 602, 603, 607, 953 (1970).
7
3 Id. 35196, 35197, 35200, 35206, 35295, 35318, 35361 (1970).
74 The Senate Report states that "[Title IX] has as its purpose the elimination of the
infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating
in interstate commerce." SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 76. A section discussing or-
ganized crime's penetration of legitimate business follows the statement of purpose. Id.
76-78.
The Senate Report, in a section by section analysis of Title IX, also states: "Subsec-
tion (4) [of section 1961] defines "enterprise" to include associations in fact, as well as
legally recognized associative entities. Thus, infiltration of any associative group by an
individual or group capable of holding a property interest can be reached." Id. 158.
Explaining that "enterprise" was defined to reach the infiltration of "any associative
group" indicates that Title IX in its entirety is aimed at curtailing the infiltration of
organizations rather than the underlying criminal activity. Although this analysis on its
face suggests that "infiltration of any associative group" could include the infiltration of
illegal business (e.g., using proceeds derived from narcotics activity to acquire an interest
in a loansharking operation), the statement of purpose in the Senate Report precludes
finding an intent to deal with infiltration of illegal enterprises in Title IX.
When the Senate debated OCCA-70, Senator McClellan provided a synopsis of the
bill, which explained that Title IX "[p]rohibits infiltration of legitimate organizations by
racketeers or proceeds of racketeering activities where interstate commerce is affected."
116 CONG. REC. 585 (1970). Senator McClellan's opening remarks during the debate
referred to Title IX as "aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organi-
zations." Id. 591: see also McClellan, supra note 6, at 141, 144:
Title IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organi-
zations ....
... Unless an individual not only commits such a crime but engages in a
pattern of such violations, and uses that pattern to obtain or operate an interest
in an interstate business, he is not made subject to proceedings under Title IX.
During discussion of the measure Senators Hruska, Yarborough, Byrd, and Thur-
mond referred to Title IX as a measure to combat organized crime's infiltration of
legitimate business. 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska), 603 (re-
marks of Senator Yarborough), 607 (remarks of Senator Byrd), 953 (remarks of Senator
Thurmond).
In hearings before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Representa-
tive Celler, Chairman of the Committee, said, "As I understand tile IX it combines
criminal and civil penalties, which are directed towards 'organized crime' infiltration of
legitimate business." House Hearings, supra note 25, at 188. He repeated his understand-
ing in debate before the full House of Representatives. 116 CONG. REC. 35196 (1970).
Several representatives, including Representatives Celler, McCulloch, St. Germain,
Kleppe, Poff, Anderson, and Pepper, spoke of the provision as aimed at fighting or-
ganized crime's penetration of legitimate business. Representative Poff's remarks were
typical: "Title IX . . . provides the machinery whereby the infiltration of racketeers into
legitimate business can be stopped and the process can be reversed when such infiltration
does occur." Id. 35295.
Other commentators on the Act also assumed that Title IX was limited to legitimate
business infiltration. See Wilson, supra note 6, at 51-52; Note, supra note 10, at 1492. Even
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Only two isolated references, one in each House of Con-
gress, were made to the application of Title IX outside of the
infiltration of legal business. 75 Neither instance undermines the
conclusion that Congress intended to deal solel with the infiltra-
tion of legitimate business.
Although the language of the statute draws no distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate operations, neither does it
explicitly encompass illicit enterprise. The legislative history re-
veals clearly that Congress' sole target was infiltration of legiti-
mate business. For the courts to parlay the product of that lim-
ited intent into an expression of statutory authorization for civil
remedies against racketeering per se would be an unwarranted
stretching of the statute. The use of civil remedies for behavior
that has traditionally been controlled through criminal penalties
is an innovative step.76 Congress was careful in limiting the ex-
tent of its creativity and the courts should be equally careful not
to ignore that limit.
the most caustic critics of the Act, who presumably would have been quick to denounce
any suggestion that the civil remedies could be applied beyond the limits discussed by
Congress, did not perceive any such possibility. See, e.g., King, supra note 3, at 108;
Statement by the American Civil Liberties Union, in Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at
489-92.
7 In a discussion among Senators Magnuson, McClellan, and Hruska, Senator Mag-
nuson expressed concern over the possibility that the Judiciary Committee, through Title
IX, was usurping the authority of the Committee on Commerce and inquired about the
Act's scope.
Mr. McClellan: [I]f it is illegal gambling, engaged in by syndicates or
shylocking or whatever, and those funds are used for investment in legitimate
business in interstate commerce that would constitute a crime under title IX.
That kind of activity is what we are trying to prevent.
Mr. Magnuson: I think that clears up the matter. Also I suppose the proceeds
from illegal activities in one State that are transported to another State to be used in
further illegal activities would be included?
Mr. Hruska: They might be involved in title IX. I agree with the comments of
[Mr. McClellan].
116 CONG. REc. 844 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
In the House of Representatives, some representatives remarked generally about the
problem of organized crime and referred briefly to provisions of the bill. Id. 35205-206,
(remarks of Representative Clancy), 35206 (remarks of Representative Kleppe), 35211
(remarks of Representative Kyl), 35289 (remarks of Representative Podell). Representa-
tive Meskill, in one such brief speech, summarized Title IX as"... mak[ing] it a crime to
engage in a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. 35328.
Representative Meskill's brief observation and Senator Magnuson's isolated specula-
tion followed by Senator Hruska's noncommittal reply and his reaffirmance of Senator
McClellan's reference to legitimate business, certainly are not sufficient to overcome the
preponderance of support for the more limited statutory interpretation.
76 See Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 151-52 (statement by Senator Hruska); cf. id.
476 (statement by the American Civil Liberties Union).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. Is a Section 1964 Case Civil or
Criminal Under the Constitution?
Congress was aware of the potential constitutional implica-
tions of dealing with criminal activity in a civil context without
the constitutional safeguards afforded criminal defendants. A
thorough effort was made to fend off potential attack. The legis-
lative history of section 1964 contains ample reference to the
remedial, equitable nature of the statute77 and to its analogy to
well-established antitrust provisions.
7 8
In Cappetto79 the issue was raised in an interesting manner.
At the discovery stage of the proceedings the defendants were
granted immunity from the use, in any subsequent criminal
prosecution, of anything disclosed through discovery.80 Because
the government considered the section 1964 action civil, how-
ever, it saw no need to immunize the defendants from the use of
their compelled discovery statements in the case at bar. The de-
fendants contended that the case was "essentially a criminal
proceeding"8' and refused to comply with discovery requests.
The court rejected the "criminal" characterization of the suit,
basing its conclusion on its belief that the relief permitted under
section 1964 "is the same kind of equitable relief that federal
courts have been granting for generations in civil actions under
Section 4 of the Sherman Act and Section 15 of the Clayton Act.
.. "82 For failure to comply with discovery, the defendants were
judged in default, preliminarily enjoined from future gambling
activity, and ordered committed for contempt pending
compliance.
83
7 See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 81, 160.
78 E.g., id. 81. The solicitation of the American Bar Association Antitrust Section's
opinion might also be construed as an effort to solidify the comparison.
79 United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 775
(1975).
80 Immunity was granted pursuant to the "use immunity" provisions of OCCA-70, 18
U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
81 502 F.2d at 1355.
82 502 F.2d at 1357. If the defendants had prevailed in their contention, the gov-
ernment would have been unable to continue discovery. Discovery is valid only as a tool
for gathering information for a particular case, not as a general investigative device.
The matter sought to be discovered must be "relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (1). Evidence that is neither admissible nor
useful in preparing for trial is not relevant. See Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469,
472 (2d Cir. 1943).
83 502 F.2d at 1355. The commitment order was stayed pending appeal.
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In relying on precedents established in the antitrust area,
the court failed to consider a significant distinction between sec-
tion 1964 and the antitrust laws. Sections one and two of the
Sherman Act, 84 for example, describe the prohibited conduct
and provide for criminal penalties while section four8 5 au-
thorizes equitable relief in government suits charging violations
of sections one and two. It is generally agreed that civil actions
may be brought in cases in which criminal prosecution would not
have been justified,86 even though the statute on its face pro-
vides no basis for such a distinction. Thus, a civil action may
succeed if the government shows that the statute has been vio-
lated; the government need not show that the violation consti-
tuted a criminal act.
On the other hand, a violation of section 1962 is an act
punishable as a crime. The circumstance that keeps the govern-
ment from bringing a criminal prosecution is not the absence of
criminal behavior (as it is in antitrust enforcement) but difficulty
of proof.87 Even a section 1964 civil action requires the govern-
ment to show commission of a criminal act. Even if it were possi-
ble to show that the incursion into legitimate business was suffi-
ciently "innocent" not to be criminal per se, the other necessary
element-a pattern of racketeering activity-requires commis-
sion of at least two acts explicitly labeled criminal.
Thus, the charge that a section 1964 action is "inherently
criminal" is true. A defendant who loses such a suit will leave the
court having been judged, by a preponderance of the evidence,
to have committed at least two acts deserving of criminal
punishment. Whether this labeling of the defendant as having
committed criminal acts, together with the burden of complying
with whatever orders the court may issue, is sufficient to require
the government to afford the defendant the protections tradi-
84 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
85 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
11 See P. AREEOA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 52-53 (2d ed. 1974). "We must thus recognize
that the courts would reconcile-if they have not already implicitly done so-the Sher-
man Act's purpose as a charter of freedom with its criminal sanctions by divorcing the
latter from the statute's civil sweep." Id. 53. See also Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963).
87 There undoubtedly are cases in which the government fails to bring a criminal
antitrust action, even though it is believed that the defendant's behavior would justify
criminal penalties, because of the difficulties of proof. Nevertheless, once the decision to
bring a civil suit is made, no criminal activity need ever be shown and the civil violation
carries with it no inherent criminality.
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tionally guaranteed to criminal defendants"8 has never been
answered definitively.
When dealing with other statutes, however, the Supreme
Court has developed two tests to determine whether a case is
actually civil in substance when a legislature has affixed that label
to a judicial proceeding. s 9 The first test focuses on the intent of
the legislature. A punitive legislative intent indicates a criminal
prosecution. The other test recognizes that the burdensome na-
ture of the result, upon a defendant, may require the granting
of some or all of the constitutional safeguards usually associated
with criminal prosecutions, even when an action is founded on
benevolent or disinterested intentions. The latter test requires a
balancing of the governmental function involved against the in-
terests of the individual.
1. The Punitive Intent Test
In Trop v. Dulles,"° a statute mandating automatic forfeiture
of citizenship upon conviction, by court-martial, of wartime de-
sertion was under attack on grounds of "cruel and unusual
punishment." The government's principal argument was that the
statute was technically regulatory, not penal, and thus there was
no "punishment." 91
Writing the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Warren dis-
missed this argument 2 and proceeded to describe the proper
test to which the government's label must be put.
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this
Court has generally based its determination upon the
purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disability
for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand
the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.-it has been consi-
dered penal. But a statute has been considered non-
penal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to
accomplish some other legitimate governmental
purpose.9 3
88 The constitutional protections traditionally guaranteed to, and associated with,
criminal defendants, will hereinafter be referred to as "criminal protections."
89 See Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment in Bar Disciplinary
Proceedings, 72 MicH. L. REv. 84, 89 (1973).
90 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
91 Id. at 94.
92 "How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally
if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them!" Id.
93 Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted).
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The plurality, finding the forfeiture provision to be punitive,
concluded that it was cruel and unusual.
94
The importance of congressional intent was illustrated
dramatically in Perez v. Brownell,95 decided the same day as Trop.
In Perez the petitioner, a native-born American, attacked a
statute under which he had been held to have forfeited his citi-
zenship by voting in a foreign election. The Court found the
statute to be the product of Congress' exercise of its power to
regulate foreign affairs and permitted the forfeiture to stand.
The Court, in dealing with two individuals who had suf-
fered identical disabilities, granted one a higher level of constitu-
tional protection than the other. Paradoxically, Trop, who was
"guilty of the very serious crime of desertion in time of war" was
given greater constitutional protection than Perez, who had
"committed no crime" by voting in a foreign political election. 96
Thus, there may be sound precedent for giving a section 1964
defendant greater protection than an antitrust defendant, even
though they are both subject to the same type of remedial or-
ders, if the congressional purpose in enacting section 1964 can
be shown to have been punitive.
97
To show that Congress had no punitive intent in adopting
section 1964 would be extremely difficult. Although the legisla-
94 Justice Brennan concurred in the result solely on the ground that it was beyond
Congress' power to enact such a statute because forfeiture of citizenship is not reasonably
calculated to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 105.
95 356 U.S. 44 (1958). This decision was overruled in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967), on the ground that Congress has no power, under the Constitution or as an
implied attribute of sovereignty, to divest a person of United States citizenship absent a
voluntary renunciation. The Court did not, however, impugn the validity of the
punitive/regulatory dichotomy.
96 See 356 U.S. at 105 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97 Other cases applying the intent test include Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963) (forfeiture of citizenship); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)
(banning certain individuals from government employment). Compare In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. 544 (1968) with Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 687, 499 P.2d 968, 974, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 288, 294 (1972) (disbarment). See generally California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427-31
(1971) (statute requiring driver involved in accident to identify himself does not violate
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (federal food and drug laws are not intended to be punitive).
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, the Court found clear evidence of punitive
intent but nevertheless provided a list of indicia to be used when legislative intent is
unclear:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
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tive history of section 1964 appears to refute such intent,98 it
cannot be denied that the civil remedies are but a minor part of
OCCA-70, one of the most severe federal attacks on crime in the
nation's history. Title X,99 for instance, prescribes increased sen-
tences of up to twenty five years upon conviction of any felony
by "dangerous special offenders." Title IX itself provides in
section 1963 for maximum penalties of a twenty year prison
sentence, a $25,000 fine, and forfeiture of any interest in an
enterprise acquired or held in violation of section 1962. The
forfeiture alone could amount to a fine of millions of dollars.
Could Congress' patently penal purposes, displayed
throughout the Act, have been "turned off" when they con-
sidered section 1964? Perhaps, but the legislative history tends to
show that the civil remedies were not adopted as a means of
regulating conduct that Congress felt should not be punished. On
the contrary, they were designed to enable the government to
reach statutory violations that could not be punished criminally
because of the problems posed by the constitutional protection
afforded criminal defendants. 00
Nevertheless, Congress was probably motivated by a desire
to stop interference or intimidation by organized crime as well as
by a desire to punish and deter. For example, one would think
that a purely punitive purpose would carry with it a well-defined
punishment, 101 yet Congress refrained from mandating the im-
relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and
may often point in differing directions.
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
98 See notes 77 & 78 supra and accompanying text.
99 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78 (1970).
100 See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text. The prosecution in Cappelto argued
that other, valid reasons exist for bringing a civil rather than criminal action, namely,
cessation of future criminal activity and acquisition of information. Brief for the United
States at 23-24. This argument ignores § 1964(d), which prevents a defendant from
relitigating, in a subsequent civil case, issues decided in a criminal proceeding. A success-
ful criminal action would virtually assure a later civil victory. Thus whenever the gov-
ernment could prove criminal liability it would be advantageous for it to do so. Future
illicit activity could be prevented more efficiently by imprisonment of the offender than
by injunction and by the economically more severe criminal forfeiture than by civil
divestiture. If in a particular case the government were unhappy with the punishment
imposed in the criminal case, § 1964(d) would make a subsequent civil order obtainable
without doing much more than filing the right papers. If, however, § 1964 were con-
strued as a criminal statute, the government would be precluded from bringing an action
thereunder after bringing a criminal action under § 1963. See generally Note, supra note
16, at 1501 n.44.
101 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (Congress imposed specific sanction
of forfeiture of citizenship); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (Congress
imposed a bar to employment).
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position of any specific penalty in successful section 1964 cases.
Indeed, a penal statute that granted a judge this degree of dis-
cretion might be considered in violation of due process require-
ments. A civil court of equity, however, is characterized by wide
discretionary power in fashioning remedies.
10 2
Even subsection (a) of section 1962, which might appear at
first to have the least credible regulatory foundation of the
section's provisions, has a rational connection with the promo-
tion of commerce. Subsection (a) is violated when an individual
acquires and operates his business honestly, if he obtained the
acquisition funds illegally. A requirement that one who wishes to
participate in an industry secure legitimate financing provides
increased opportunity for the investment of funds earned
through legitimate channels, thus promoting fair competition
within the industry. On the other hand, the illegal origin of
funds might portend illegal operation of the business. Thus even
section 1962(a) has an arguably rational connection with the
promotion of commerce.
Chief Justice Warren's statement of the punitive intent test
does not recognize the possibility of dual motivation of the kind
present in the drafting of section 1964.103 Analysis of the Trop
decision suggests that punitive intent should preclude resort to
civil regulatory remedies only when no substantial, valid basis for
the statute, independent of the desire to punish, exists. When
conduct, such as racketeering, affects the nation's commerce, it
falls within the Congress' commerce clause powers to regulate.
0 4
The fact that the government might also like to see the offender
imprisoned does not destroy that power. This rule is consistent
with Trop 10 5 because in that case punitive intent was the only
rationale for the statute.
2. Balancing Test
Even when the legislature's intent does not require that the
proceeding be treated as a criminal case, the Court has held that
some criminal safeguards may nevertheless be appropriate. In re
Gault10 6 was the landmark case for balancing the effect upon the
102 See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 390-92 (1945).
103 But cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), quoted at note
97 supra.
104 Note 33 supra and accompanying text.
105 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); see text accompanying notes 90-94supra.
106 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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defendant against the governmental interest to determine the
necessity of granting criminal protections. Gault was a juvenile
who claimed the fifth amendment's protection against self-
incrimination in a juvenile court proceeding, technically a civil
case.'0 7 The Court did not challenge the benevolent, non-
punitive intentions of the draftsmen of the juvenile justice
system, but still found the interests of the juvenile sufficiently
important to require the protection afforded by the right to
counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right
to confront witnesses-protections traditionally enjoyed only by
criminal defendants.
10 8
The Court based its conclusions primarily on the possibility
that the juvenile would suffer an extended commitment to a
detention center as a result of the proceeding. 09 In this respect,
the Court's holding is of little use to section 1964 defendants
since a proceeding under that section does not carry with it the
threat of a similar loss of liberty. 10
The Court was also concerned, however, with the effect on
reputation that would flow from the stigma of an adjudication of
delinquency."' The question whether the fifth amendment can
be invoked to protect one's reputation has arisen in connection
with grants of immunity. In Brown v. Walker,"12 a witness was
offered transactional immunity' 13 in return for his testimony.
0 7 Id. at 17 & n.22.
108 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), extended the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof to juvenile proceedings. The flexibility of the balancing test was dem-
onstrated in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), in which the Court held that
a juvenile is not entitled to a jury trial.
109 See 387 U.S. at 27-28, 50.
""0 But see text accompanying notes 132-53 infra.
111 387 U.S. at 23-25.
For a suggestion that public condemnation is precisely the difference between a civil
and criminal sanction, see Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
401, 405 (1958):
[Crime] is not simply anything which a legislature chooses to call a "crime." It is
not simply antisocial conduct which public officers are given a responsibility to
suppress. It is not simply any conduct to which a legislature chooses to attach a
"criminal" penalty. It is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will
incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the condemnation of the com-
munity.
112 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
113 "Transactional immunity" gives the recipient absolute immunity from prosecu-
tion for any act to which he testifies. It is contrasted with "use immunity" under which
the witness receives only a guarantee that his testimony will not be used to aid in his
prosecution. He may still be prosecuted for the acts to which he testifies with other,
independent evidence. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding
the constitutionality of the use immunity provisions in OCCA-70).
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He refused to testify, claiming that his privilege not to incrimi-
nate himself was absolute and provided protection from the pub-
lic airing of his crimes whether or not criminal prosecution
would follow. The Court rejected this argument: "The design of
the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating
his character, but to protect him against being compelled to fur-
nish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge."
' 14
When the question arose again in Ullmann v. United States,
1" 5
the witness attempted to distinguish Brown by claiming that the
damage would not be to his reputation in the abstract, but would
result in various concrete disabilities including probable loss of
employment. The Court once again rejected the claim of
privilege, because of the non-criminal nature of a sanction that
flows indirectly from public disapproval rather than from gov-
ernmental punishment.
16
The concern for reputation in Gault can be reconciled with
its absence in Brown and Ullmann by their differing degrees of
governmental action in establishing the stigma. In situations such
as Brown and Ullmann the stigma results indirectly from the wit-
ness' own testimony, while in delinquency proceedings the
stigma is a direct product of the judicial pronouncement of de-
linquency.
The section 1964 situation resembles Gault more than Brown
and Ullmann. The judicial labeling of the defendants as rack-
eteers would carry with it the same potential for public censure
that the label of juvenile delinquent carried in Gault. It is un-
likely, however, that the Gault Court would have based its deci-
sion on damage to reputation alone. The potential loss of liberty
was clearly the linchpin of the decision. 1 7 This loss of liberty,
together with the more compelling policy reasons for protecting
a juvenile's reputation than for protecting that of a racketeer,"18
sufficiently distinguishes Gault from a section 1964 case to rule
out a claim of damaged reputation as a sufficient basis for a
114 161 U.S. at 605-06.
11- 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
"'Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Black, arguing that there are no
exceptions to the literal language of the protection against self-incrimination. 350 U.S. at
443 (1956).
" See 387 U.S. at 50.
,,8 A juvenile's actions are considered the product of an immature mind. Taking
such actions as indicia of the character of the individual upon his reaching adulthood is
less valid than judging character by acts committed during adulthood. Cf. FED. R. EviD.
609(d).
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claim of fifth amendment or other constitutional protection
under section 1964.
The defendants in Cappetto attempted to support their claim
to a privilege against self-incrimination with an alternative ar-
gument. They contended that testimony secured by a grant of
use immunity should be treated like a coerced confession with
regard to the declarant. Such a confession, it was argued, would
not be permitted as proof even if the action were clearly a civil
suit.11 9 This analogy is inappropriate, 120 but the Cappetto defen-
dants are not solely responsible for the faulty reasoning. The
Court in Kastigar v. United States,' 2 ' in upholding the statutory
authorization of use immunity contained in OCCA-70, charac-
terized use immunity as "analogous to the Fifth Amendment
requirement in cases of coerced confessions."'1
22
The reasons for prohibiting the use of coerced confessions
in civil cases do not exist, however, when the testimony is com-
pelled through a grant of immunity. First, there is the strong
possibility that a coerced confession will be untruthful, because
made solely to stop the bullying. 123 No such risk exists under an
immunity grant. Second, a coerced confession requires exertion
of governmental force in an illegal way. The policy of preventing
official lawlessness 124 requires denying the government the use,
in any way, of the product of its wrongful behavior. A grant of
immunity, of course, is not an illegal government action that
should be discouraged. Thus, to secure the protection of the
fifth amendment or other criininal protections, the section 1964
defendant must show the significance, as compared to criminal
sanctions, of the other potential harms that accompany a section
1964 civil proceeding.
The other potential adverse effect of losing a suit under
section 1964 is economic. The district court may order the de-
fendant to divest himself of his interest in the enterprise in-
volved in the violation. Under a divestiture order, the defendant
would be required to sell his interest in the enterprise but would
be allowed to retain the proceeds from the sale. Even if he ob-
119 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 20.
120 Cf. Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the
Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REV. 470, 478 (1974):
121 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
122 Id. at 461.
123 See, e.g., J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (rev. ed. McNaughton 1961).
124 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
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tained the investment funds illegally, the defendant would be
free to reinvest in government bonds, savings accounts, or pub-
licly held companies if he kept his holding in any one company
below one percent.
12 5
Divestiture has a lesser economic impact than the forfeiture
possible under section 1963,126 which terminates the defendant's
ownership without permitting him to be compensated. Forfei-
ture, even when disguised behind a civil label, has been held to
be a criminal penalty127 and is recognized as such by section
1963. Divestiture may produce adverse economic consequences,
however. For example, a seller under compulsion to sell will
generally be in a disadvantageous bargaining position and may
be unable to secure as high a price as he otherwise could. Also, a
divestiture order under the circumstances involved in Title IX
may damage severely the enterprise's goodwill; payment for
goodwill is often a major part of the purchase price of a going
concern. In some cases, the defendant may have developed ex-
pertise in the management of the enterprise which will be sac-
rificed if he sells the business. Other circumstances undoubtedly
would produce other negative economic effects.
Despite these adverse economic results, whose effect could
make divestiture indistinguishable from a partial forfeiture or
fine, the Supreme Court has not found economic loss sufficient
to remove the civil label from divestiture.
Courts are not authorized in civil proceedings to punish
antitrust violators, and relief must not be punitive. But
courts are authorized, indeed required, to decree relief
effective to redress the violations, whatever the adverse
effect of such a decree on private interests. Divestiture
is itself an equitable remedy designed to protect the
public interest ....
[.. T]he Government cannot be denied the latter
remedy because economic hardship, however severe,
may result. Economic hardship can influence choice
only as among two or more effective remedies.1
2 8
125 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970).
126 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1970).
127 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
I'l United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-27 (1961).
DuPont was ordered to divest itself of its large holding of General Motors stock. The
release of such a large block of shares on the market, it was agreed, would reduce the
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Even divestiture is permitted only when necessary,
however, 129 because choice of a harsher remedy instead of an
equally effective and less burdensome option that is available is
clearly punitive. Therefore, as in antitrust cases, particular
remedies may pose constitutional problems, given the wide dis-
cretion allowed by the Act in fashioning remedies. A defendant
who is the object of a punitive judicial intent could attack the
order as an unconstitutional imposition of punishment. The rule
enunciated in Du Pont, however, precludes reliance on unfavor-
able economic consequences alone as a basis for requiring crimi-
nal protections.
The damage to reputation, the economic loss inherent in
divestiture, and the other interests a section 1964 defendant may
have at stake (such as loss of employment), though certainly not
trivial, do not rise to the level of overriding the government's
need for regulation and supporting remedies in the area covered
by Title IX.130 Although Gault's131 extension of criminal protec-
tions to technically noncriminal defendants was not limited to
cases in which imprisonment could occur, the Court's consistent
approval of the type of equitable remedies permitted under sec-
tion 1964 strongly suggests that Gault should not be extended to
cover these defendants.
B. A Problem in Monitoring Compliance
After an antitrust decree is handed down, the government is
generally able to monitor compliance through "visitation
rights."132 The government is given the right to demand specific
market price of the stock, so that DuPont would be able to realize only a fraction of the
stock's then current market value. Interestingly, Congress reacted more sympathetically
than the Court: It enacted a provision, INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 1111, to ease the
financial loss through a tax "break."
129 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1951); see
generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1941), transferred to the Second Circuit,.322 U.S. 716 (1944), modified, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
130 Part II of this Comment concluded that Title IX does not encompass illegal
operations that do not have connections with legitimate enterprises. Under the alterna-
tive interpretation, that the statute applies to both legitimate and illicit enterprises per se,
the statute would still be sufficiently regulatory in purpose and harmless in effect to
permit civil remedies. The congressional findings on the direct effect of organized crime
on commerce, SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-2, would provide a sufficient basis for
regulation designed to deal specifically with racketeering.
131 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
132 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 579 (1966); see United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 95 (1950).
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reports, examine company documents, and interview company
employees. It has been termed an important and customary pro-
vision of an antitrust decree. 133
The United States Attorney's Office requested a similar
provision in Cappetto. The court was asked to issue "an order
directing each of the defendants to submit to the United States
Attorney for a period of ten years sworn quarterly reports stat-
ing his current address, business sources of income and other
information bearing on his compliance with the injunction the
Court is asked to enter. .... -134 Both the district court 135 and the
court of appeals 36 expressed doubts about the propriety of such
an order but neither passed final judgment on it. The district
court postponed decision on this question and on the request for
a permanent injunction, pending defendants' appeal of the de-
fault and contempt orders. The appellate court affirmed the
district court's orders and remanded for decision on the remain-
ing issues.
The doubts expressed, however, are well founded. In Shap-
iro v. United States' 37 the Court held that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to records
that the defendant is required to keep by law, to provide infor-
mation on transactions properly subject to government regula-
tion. Government regulations that required the keeping and
production of records needed for the enforcement of price con-
trols were upheld. This exception to the fifth amendment would
preclude protestations that the antitrust visitation rights violate
the Constitution.' 38
In Marchetti v. United States' 39 and Grosso v. United States,' 40
however, the Shapiro exception was held inapplicable to a statute
requiring the keeping of records and filing of reports for the
purpose of assessing a gambling tax. The Marchetti Court distin-
guished Shapiro because of the absence of the three necessary
133 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 579 (1966).
134 502 F.2d at 1355.
135 Decision of the District Court Rendered Orally on Apr. 22, 1974, in Appendix to
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14, 17.
136 502 F.2d at 1359.
137 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
138 Because the fifth amendment does not apply to corporate or partnership records,
the Shapiro doctrine would only be necessary in antitrust cases against individual entre-
preneurs. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
139 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
140 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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elements of the Shapiro doctrine. First, the records at issue in
Marchetti were not "of the same kind as he has customarily kept."
Second, the "public aspects" of the Shapiro records were not
present. Third, the Shapiro records involved "an essentially non-
criminal and regulatory area of inquiry.' 4 1 In Grosso, the Court
focused on the same criteria, finding it unnecessary to "examine
the relative significance of these three factors," because at least
two of them were plainly absent. 1 42 The Court did not question
the credibility of the government's insistence that its concern was
collection of revenue not prosecution of gamblers, but the Court
held that this legitimate concern could not render insignificant
"the characteristics of the activities about which information is
sought, or the composition of the group to which the inquiries
are made."'
143
The type of report requested in Cappetto would also fail to
satisfy at least two, and probably all three, of the Shapiro criteria.
First, the requested reports would not be the kind of records
ordinarily kept by individuals. This would be especially apparent
if the court ordered divestiture, forcing the defendants out of
business and into a different, probably more private, way of
earning a living. Second, the reports would not have the kind of
"public" character of records kept by a publicly licensed busi-
ness, such as the one operated in Shapiro. Finally, the group to
which the order in Cappetto would be directed is precisely the
group involved in Marchetti and Grosso: gamblers-a group
whose business dealings can hardly be classified as "essentially
non-criminal."'
144
The legitimate regulatory purpose of Title IX is as irrelev-
ant as was the legitimate taxing purpose in Marchetti and Grosso.
Although this conclusion appears to contradict the rationale just
developed to permit discovery, 145 there is a significant difference
between these requested reports and discovery. The permissible
use of information gathered through discovery is limited to pro-
ving a civil case. The reports, on the other hand, could become
the basis for a criminal prosecution for any racketeering activity
reported, or for a contempt prosecution if the reports indicated
141 390 U.S. at 57.
142 390 U.S. at 67-68.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 57.
145 Text accompanying notes 106-30 supra.
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noncompliance with the court order.146 If the government's con-
cern was primarily enforcement of the order, immunity from
criminal prosecution for the racketeering activity might be
granted. This probably would solve the problem encountered in
Marchetti and Grosso of directing the inquiry against persons sus-
pected of criminal activity. Nevertheless, the Cappetto request
would still fail to meet two of the Shapiro criteria, and in Grosso
that failing sufficed to preclude application of the Shapiro
exception. 1
47
Thus the reports to be filed would have to be considered
testimony subject to the privilege against self-incrimination. The
privilege has long been recognized as applicable in criminal con-
tempt proceedings.148 If the reports revealed noncompliance
they could not be used in a criminal contempt prosecution.
The government might, however, attempt to initiate a civil
contempt action. The privilege has never been held applicable in
a civil contempt action even though imprisonment may result.
The Supreme Court in Shillitani v. United States149 approved of
imprisonment based on civil contempt. The Court distinguished
civil from criminal contempt by the former's coercive rather than
punitive purpose. "While any imprisonment, of course, has puni-
tive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if the
court conditions release upon the contemnor's willingness to
[comply]."' 5
The holding in Shillitani should not be taken as an indication
that the self-incrimination privilege does not apply in any civil
contempt proceeding. The Court was considering two limited
issues: how to define civil contempt and whether an indictment
and jury trial are required prior to civil commitment. The Court
held that they are not required.15 ' In the juvenile justice area the
'1" The antitrust laws specifically provide for punishment for disobedience of court
orders, 15 U.S.C. § 1314(d) (1970). A comparable provision in Title IX was omitted
because it was considered redundant; the legislators felt that the power to compel com-
pliance inheres in the power to issue the order. See HousE REPORT, supra note 40, at
4036.
147 This presumes, of course, that all three factors are to be given equal weight-a
question left open by the Grosso Court, see text accompanying note 142 supra. It is not
unlikely that the "essentially non-criminal and regulatory" factor (missing in Grosso) is the
crucial one, so that if this concern were satisfied through a grant of immunity, the
absence of the other two factors might not be fatal.
' See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924).
149 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
150 Id. at 370.
151 Id. at 370-71.
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Court has held the fifth amendment applicable even though it
found ajury trial unnecessary.
52
The rationale of Gault makes the fifth amendment applica-
ble whenever imprisonment is threatened. 153 The basic premise
of the privilege, that an individual cannot be compelled to fur-
nish the words that may deprive him of his freedom, is violated
even when the prisoner has the option of complying and going
free. Similarly, there is no meaningful distinction between a case
in which a criminal fine may be imposed, in which the fifth
amendment is applicable, 154 and a civil contempt action in which
the contemnor may have to pay damages to the government.
Shillitani authorizes the government to imprison a witness until
he complies, but nothing grants the government authority to
compel the defendant personally to supply the evidence that
proves noncompliance.
The reports requested by the government in Cappetto could
compel the defendants to incriminate themselves in violation of
the fifth amendment. Thus, filing the reports could be required
constitutionally only if the defendants were granted immunity
from use of the reports in a separate criminal prosecution, a
criminal contempt prosecution, or a civil contempt action leading
to imprisonment or "fine." This restriction would render the
reports virtually useless and make it unlikely that the govern-
ment would continue to ask for such orders.
152 Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971).
1-3 [C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will,
whether it is called "criminal" or "civil." And our Constitution guarantees that
no person shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself when he is
threatened with deprivation of his liberty-a command which this Court has
broadly applied and generously implemented ....
387 U.S. at 50.
There is also support for applying the privilege against self-incrimination in cases on
insanity commitments. See McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245, 254-57 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 1100-02 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-
judge court), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Fielding, Compul-
sory Psychiatric Examination in Civil Commitment and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 9
GONZAGA L. REV. 117 (1973). See generally Dixon, Comment on Immunity Provisions, in
UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, 2 WORKING
PAPERS 1405, 1414 (1970) (suggesting that determination of "what kinds of penalties,
forfeitures, or other harms falling short of conventional criminal prosecutions are in-
cluded within the scope of the constitutional privilege" be left to the process of constitu-
tional interpretation). But see Sewell, The Self-Incrimination Clause and Administrative Law,
39 TENN. L. REV. 207 (1972) (arguing that the privilege should apply only in conven-
tional criminal trials).
154 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886).
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If the government is deprived of these reports, civil rem-
edies need not be unenforceable. Although the easiest means of
obtaining information may well be foreclosed, presumably the
sources of information through which the government found
enough evidence to win its original case would still be available.
The added governmental burden may be offset by the deterrent
effect that the threat of a continuing governmental investigation,
for which no immunity need be granted, may bring.
IV. CONCLUSION
Title IX is designed to maintain the integrity of business
enterprises supplying lawful public needs. Congress may decide
eventually to extend the use of civil remedies to combat more
indirect economic effects of criminal activity, unrelated to par-
ticular business enterprises. But it has not yet done so under
Title IX.
155
Despite the criminal nature of the underlying problem, the
grant of regulatory power under section 1964 is sufficiently un-
burdensome in effect to justify the use of equitable remedies
without the grant of criminal protections. The racketeering
crimes covered by the Act are economic crimes. The objective of
the criminals affected by Title IX is profit. Their willingness to
violate criminal laws in their pursuit of profit should not create a
constitutional shield that is denied to more conventional
businessmen, when they are called to answer in civil suits for
economic wrongs.
115 Even without specific statutory authorization, the courts' power to restrain par-
ticular acts that threaten significant, irreparable harm to the nation's commerce is not
disputed. See, e.g., United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); cf. In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895). Thus if particular racketeering activity poses such a threat it may be
enjoined without reference to section 1964.
